COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATIONIncomplete

CWE-1319

Improper Protection against Electromagnetic Fault Injection (EM-FI)

The device is susceptible to electromagnetic fault injection attacks, causing device internal information to be compromised or security mechanisms to be bypassed.

Soyutlama

Base

Yapı

Simple

Sömürü İhtimali

Medium

Problemi anla

Problem nedir?

The device is susceptible to electromagnetic fault injection attacks, causing device internal information to be compromised or security mechanisms to be bypassed.

Genişletilmiş açıklama

Electromagnetic fault injection may allow an attacker to locally and dynamically modify the signals (both internal and external) of an integrated circuit. EM-FI attacks consist of producing a local, transient magnetic field near the device, inducing current in the device wires. A typical EMFI setup is made up of a pulse injection circuit that generates a high current transient in an EMI coil, producing an abrupt magnetic pulse which couples to the target producing faults in the device, which can lead to: - Bypassing security mechanisms such as secure JTAG or Secure Boot - Leaking device information - Modifying program flow - Perturbing secure hardware modules (e.g. random number generators)

Kök neden

Problem nasıl ve ne zaman oluşur?

Yaşam döngüsü evresi

Architecture and Design

Yaşam döngüsü evresi

Implementation

Risk

Başarılı sömürü neye yol açar?

Modify MemoryRead MemoryGain Privileges or Assume IdentityBypass Protection MechanismExecute Unauthorized Code or Commands

Etkilenen güvenlik alanları: Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control, Availability

Savunma

Nasıl önlenir ve çözülür?

Architecture and Design · Implementation

Birden fazla yaşam döngüsü evresinde uygulanacak savunma

Detay
- 1. Redundancy - By replicating critical operations and comparing the two outputs can help indicate whether a fault has been injected. - 2. Error detection and correction codes - Gay, Mael, et al. proposed a new scheme that not only detects faults injected by a malicious adversary but also automatically corrects single nibble/byte errors introduced by low-multiplicity faults. - 3. Fail by default coding - When checking conditions (switch or if) check all possible cases and fail by default because the default case in a switch (or the else part of a cascaded if-else-if construct) is used for dealing with the last possible (and valid) value without checking. This is prone to fault injection because this alternative is easily selected as a result of potential data manipulation [REF-1141]. - 4. Random Behavior - adding random delays before critical operations, so that timing is not predictable. - 5. Program Flow Integrity Protection - The program flow can be secured by integrating run-time checking aiming at detecting control flow inconsistencies. One such example is tagging the source code to indicate the points not to be bypassed [REF-1147]. - 6. Sensors - Usage of sensors can detect variations in voltage and current. - 7. Shields - physical barriers to protect the chips from malicious manipulation.