COMMON ATTACK PATTERN ENUMERATION AND CLASSIFICATIONLive MITRE record
CAPEC-146
XML Schema Poisoning
An adversary corrupts or modifies the content of XML schema information passed between a client and server for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. XML Schemas provide the structure and content definitions for XML documents. Schema poisoning is the ability to manipulate a schema either by replacing or modifying it to compromise the programs that process documents that use this schema.
Abstraction
Detailed
Typical severity
High
Likelihood of attack
Low
Understand the attack
What is this attack pattern?
An adversary corrupts or modifies the content of XML schema information passed between a client and server for the purpose of undermining the security of the target. XML Schemas provide the structure and content definitions for XML documents. Schema poisoning is the ability to manipulate a schema either by replacing or modifying it to compromise the programs that process documents that use this schema.
Execution flow
How does the attack proceed, step by step?
Explore
Determine if XML schema is local or remote
Because this attack differs slightly if the target uses remote XML schemas versus local schemas, the adversary first needs to determine which of the two are used.
Experiment
Gain access to XML schema
The adversary gains access to the XML schema so that they can modify the contents.
Techniques used
- For a local scenario, the adversary needs access to the machine that the schema is located on and needs to gain permissions to alter the contents of the file.
- For a remote scenario, the adversary needs to be able to sniff HTTP traffic that contains an XML schema.
Exploit
Poison XML schema
Once the adversary gains access to the XML schema, they will alter it to achieve a desired effect. Locally, they can simply modify the file. For remote schemas, the adversary will alter the schema in transit by performing an adversary in the middle attack.
Techniques used
- Cause a denial of service by modifying the schema so that it does not contain required information for subsequent processing. For example, the unaltered schema may require a @name attribute in all submitted documents. If the adversary removes this attribute from the schema then documents created using the new grammar may lack this field, which may cause the processing application to enter an unexpected state or record incomplete data.
- Manipulation of the data types described in the schema may affect the results of calculations. For example, a float field could be changed to an int field.
- Change the encoding defined in the schema for certain fields allowing the contents to bypass filters that scan for dangerous strings. For example, the modified schema might use a URL encoding instead of ASCII, and a filter that catches a semicolon (;) might fail to detect its URL encoding (%3B).
Requirements
What does the attack require?
Prerequisites
- Some level of access to modify the target schema.
- The schema used by the target application must be improperly secured against unauthorized modification and manipulation.
Skills required
Not stated in the MITRE record.
Resources required
- Access to the schema and the knowledge and ability modify it. Ability to replace or redirect access to the modified schema.
Impact
What does a successful attack lead to?
Unreliable ExecutionResource Consumption
Affected scopes: Availability
Modify Data
Affected scopes: Integrity
Read Data
Affected scopes: Confidentiality
Defence
How is it prevented and mitigated?
1
Design: Protect the schema against unauthorized modification.
2
Implementation: For applications that use a known schema, use a local copy or a known good repository instead of the schema reference supplied in the XML document. Additionally, ensure that the proper permissions are set on local files to avoid unauthorized modification.
3
Implementation: For applications that leverage remote schemas, use the HTTPS protocol to prevent modification of traffic in transit and to avoid unauthorized modification.
Real world
MITRE example instances
Example instance 1Detail
XML Schema Poisoning Attacks can often occur locally due to being embedded within the XML document itself or being located on the host within an improperaly protected file. In these cases, the adversary can simply edit the XML schema without the need for additional privileges. An example of the former can be seen below:
<?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE contact [ <!ELEMENT contact (name,phone,email,address)> <!ELEMENT name (#PCDATA)> <!ELEMENT phone (#PCDATA)> <!ELEMENT email (#PCDATA)> <!ELEMENT address (#PCDATA)> ]> <note> <name>John Smith</name> <phone>555-1234</phone> <email>jsmith@email.com</email> <address>1 Example Lane</address> </note></capec:Code>
If the 'name' attribute is required in all submitted documents and this field is removed by the adversary, the application may enter an unexpected state or record incomplete data. Additionally, if this data is needed to perform additional functions, a Denial of Service (DOS) may occur.
Example instance 2Detail
XML Schema Poisoning Attacks can also be executed remotely if the HTTP protocol is being used to transport data. :
<?xml version="1.0"?> <!DOCTYPE contact SYSTEM "http://example.com/contact.dtd"[ <note> <name>John Smith</name> <phone>555-1234</phone> <email>jsmith@email.com</email> <address>1 Example Lane</address> </note></capec:Code>
The HTTP protocol does not encrypt the traffic it transports, so all communication occurs in plaintext. This traffic can be observed and modified by the adversary during transit to alter the XML schema before it reaches the end user. The adversary can perform a Adversary-in-the-Middle ( CAPEC-94 ) Attack to alter the schema in the same way as the previous example and to acheive the same results.