COMMON ATTACK PATTERN ENUMERATION AND CLASSIFICATIONLive MITRE record

CAPEC-672

Malicious Code Implanted During Chip Programming

During the programming step of chip manufacture, an adversary with access and necessary technical skills maliciously alters a chip’s intended program logic to produce an effect intended by the adversary when the fully manufactured chip is deployed and in operational use. Intended effects can include the ability of the adversary to remotely control a host system to carry out malicious acts.

Abstraction

Detailed

Typical severity

High

Likelihood of attack

Low

Understand the attack

What is this attack pattern?

During the programming step of chip manufacture, an adversary with access and necessary technical skills maliciously alters a chip’s intended program logic to produce an effect intended by the adversary when the fully manufactured chip is deployed and in operational use. Intended effects can include the ability of the adversary to remotely control a host system to carry out malicious acts.

Requirements

What does the attack require?

Prerequisites

  • An adversary would need to have access to a foundry’s or chip maker’s development/production environment where programs for specific chips are developed, managed and uploaded into targeted chips prior to distribution or sale.

Skills required

  • Medium: An adversary needs to be skilled in microprogramming, manipulation of configuration management systems, and in the operation of tools used for the uploading of programs into chips during manufacture. Uploading can be for individual chips or performed on a large scale basis.

Resources required

Not stated in the MITRE record.

Impact

What does a successful attack lead to?

Alter Execution Logic

Affected scopes: Integrity

Defence

How is it prevented and mitigated?

1
Utilize DMEA’s (Defense Microelectronics Activity) Trusted Foundry Program members for acquisition of microelectronic components.
2
Ensure that each supplier performing hardware development implements comprehensive, security-focused configuration management of microcode and microcode generating tools and software.
3
Require that provenance of COTS microelectronic components be known whenever procured.
4
Conduct detailed vendor assessment before acquiring COTS hardware.

Real world

MITRE example instances

Example instance 1Detail
Following a chip’s production process steps of test and verification and validation of chip circuitry, an adversary involved in the generation of microcode defining the chip’s function(s) inserts a malicious instruction that will become part of the chip’s program. When integrated into a system, the chip will produce an effect intended by the adversary.