COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATIONDraft

CWE-1268

Policy Privileges are not Assigned Consistently Between Control and Data Agents

The product's hardware-enforced access control for a particular resource improperly accounts for privilege discrepancies between control and write policies.

Abstraction

Base

Structure

Simple

Likelihood of Exploit

Medium

Understand the problem

What is the problem?

The product's hardware-enforced access control for a particular resource improperly accounts for privilege discrepancies between control and write policies.

Extended description

Integrated circuits and hardware engines may provide access to resources (device-configuration, encryption keys, etc.) belonging to trusted firmware or software modules (commonly set by a BIOS or a bootloader). These accesses are typically controlled and limited by the hardware. Hardware design access control is sometimes implemented using a policy. A policy defines which entity or agent may or may not be allowed to perform an action. When a system implements multiple levels of policies, a control policy may allow direct access to a resource as well as changes to the policies themselves. Resources that include agents in their control policy but not in their write policy could unintentionally allow an untrusted agent to insert itself in the write policy register. Inclusion in the write policy register could allow a malicious or misbehaving agent write access to resources. This action could result in security compromises including leaked information, leaked encryption keys, or modification of device configuration.

Root cause

How and when does the problem arise?

Lifecycle phase

Architecture and Design

This weakness may be introduced during the design of a device when the architect does not comprehensively specify all of the policies required by an agent.

Lifecycle phase

Implementation

This weakness may be introduced during implementation if device policy restrictions do not sufficiently constrain less-privileged clients.

Risk

What does successful exploitation lead to?

Modify MemoryRead MemoryDoS: Crash, Exit, or RestartExecute Unauthorized Code or CommandsGain Privileges or Assume IdentityBypass Protection MechanismRead Files or DirectoriesReduce Reliability

Affected security scopes: Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Access Control

Defence

How is it prevented and fixed?

Architecture and Design · Implementation

Defence to apply across several lifecycle phases

Detail
Access-control-policy definition and programming flow must be sufficiently tested in pre-silicon and post-silicon testing.