COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATIONDraft

CWE-1316

Fabric-Address Map Allows Programming of Unwarranted Overlaps of Protected and Unprotected Ranges

The address map of the on-chip fabric has protected and unprotected regions overlapping, allowing an attacker to bypass access control to the overlapping portion of the protected region.

Abstraction

Base

Structure

Simple

Likelihood of Exploit

Medium

Understand the problem

What is the problem?

The address map of the on-chip fabric has protected and unprotected regions overlapping, allowing an attacker to bypass access control to the overlapping portion of the protected region.

Extended description

Various ranges can be defined in the system-address map, either in the memory or in Memory-Mapped-IO (MMIO) space. These ranges are usually defined using special range registers that contain information, such as base address and size. Address decoding is the process of determining for which range the incoming transaction is destined. To ensure isolation, ranges containing secret data are access-control protected. Occasionally, these ranges could overlap. The overlap could either be intentional (e.g. due to a limited number of range registers or limited choice in choosing size of the range) or unintentional (e.g. introduced by errors). Some hardware designs allow dynamic remapping of address ranges assigned to peripheral MMIO ranges. In such designs, intentional address overlaps can be created through misconfiguration by malicious software. When protected and unprotected ranges overlap, an attacker could send a transaction and potentially compromise the protections in place, violating the principle of least privilege.

Root cause

How and when does the problem arise?

Lifecycle phase

Architecture and Design

Lifecycle phase

Implementation

Risk

What does successful exploitation lead to?

Bypass Protection MechanismRead MemoryModify Memory

Affected security scopes: Confidentiality, Integrity, Access Control, Authorization

Defence

How is it prevented and fixed?

Architecture and Design

Architecture and design approach

Detail
When architecting the address map of the chip, ensure that protected and unprotected ranges are isolated and do not overlap. When designing, ensure that ranges hardcoded in Register-Transfer Level (RTL) do not overlap.

Implementation

Implementation-phase defence

Detail
Ranges configured by firmware should not overlap. If overlaps are mandatory because of constraints such as a limited number of registers, then ensure that no assets are present in the overlapped portion.

Testing

Testing and verification approach

Detail
Validate mitigation actions with robust testing.

Verification

How is it detected?

Automated Dynamic Analysis

High
Review address map in specification to see if there are any overlapping ranges.

Manual Static Analysis

High
Negative testing of access control on overlapped ranges.
CWE-1316: Common Weakness Enumeration Entry CWE-1316 · DayBreach Sözlük · DayBreach