COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATIONIncomplete

CWE-150

Improper Neutralization of Escape, Meta, or Control Sequences

The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could be interpreted as escape, meta, or control character sequences when they are sent to a downstream component.

Abstraction

Variant

Structure

Simple

Likelihood of Exploit

Medium

Understand the problem

What is the problem?

The product receives input from an upstream component, but it does not neutralize or incorrectly neutralizes special elements that could be interpreted as escape, meta, or control character sequences when they are sent to a downstream component.

Terminology

Alternate terms and usages

ANSI injection

injection of ANSI escape sequences.

Root cause

How and when does the problem arise?

Lifecycle phase

Build and Compilation

During LLM training, escape sequences may be assigned within token entry values.

Lifecycle phase

Implementation

Interactive command line interfaces have become more commonplace with growing system administration needs and human-friendly TUIs (text-based user interfaces); logging user-generated values into the terminal into one of these sessions is no longer safe.

Lifecycle phase

Implementation

REALIZATION: This weakness is caused during implementation of an architectural security tactic.

Risk

What does successful exploitation lead to?

Execute Unauthorized Code or CommandsHide ActivitiesUnexpected State

Affected security scopes: Integrity

ANSI escape codes can be used for low-severity attacks such as changing the color of console output, but they can also be used to arbitrarily move the cursor, clear the screen, and make fake prompts inside the interactive CLI via malicious user input. In some contexts - depending on the functionality of the terminal in use - ANSI escape codes can be used to execute arbitrary code.

Defence

How is it prevented and fixed?

All phases

General mitigation and defence approach

Detail
Developers should anticipate that escape, meta and control characters/sequences will be injected/removed/manipulated in the input vectors of their product. Use an appropriate combination of denylists and allowlists to ensure only valid, expected and appropriate input is processed by the system.

Implementation

Input Validation

Detail
Assume all input is malicious. Use an "accept known good" input validation strategy, i.e., use a list of acceptable inputs that strictly conform to specifications. Reject any input that does not strictly conform to specifications, or transform it into something that does. When performing input validation, consider all potentially relevant properties, including length, type of input, the full range of acceptable values, missing or extra inputs, syntax, consistency across related fields, and conformance to business rules. As an example of business rule logic, "boat" may be syntactically valid because it only contains alphanumeric characters, but it is not valid if the input is only expected to contain colors such as "red" or "blue." Do not rely exclusively on looking for malicious or malformed inputs. This is likely to miss at least one undesirable input, especially if the code's environment changes. This can give attackers enough room to bypass the intended validation. However, denylists can be useful for detecting potential attacks or determining which inputs are so malformed that they should be rejected outright.

Implementation

Output Encoding

Detail
While it is risky to use dynamically-generated query strings, code, or commands that mix control and data together, sometimes it may be unavoidable. Properly quote arguments and escape any special characters within those arguments. The most conservative approach is to escape or filter all characters that do not pass an extremely strict allowlist (such as everything that is not alphanumeric or white space). If some special characters are still needed, such as white space, wrap each argument in quotes after the escaping/filtering step. Be careful of argument injection (CWE-88).

Implementation

Input Validation

Detail
Inputs should be decoded and canonicalized to the application's current internal representation before being validated (CWE-180). Make sure that the application does not decode the same input twice (CWE-174). Such errors could be used to bypass allowlist validation schemes by introducing dangerous inputs after they have been checked.

Implementation

Implementation-phase defence

Detail
When using output from an LLM, neutralize or strip escape codes before redirecting output to the terminal or other rendering engine that would process the codes. The neutralization could require that the character be printable and/or allowable whitespace, such as a carriage return or newline. Be deliberate about what to allow.

Effectiveness: High

By restricting output to only printable characters, this effectively removes any escape codes.

Build and Compilation

Build and Compilation aşaması savunması

Detail
When using an LLM: during tokenizer training, suppress escape codes from the tokenizer's vocabulary. Depending on context, this could be accomplished by removing the codes from input to the tokenizer, or removing the map from the string to its token ID. It is generally unlikely that this removal would adversely affect the quality or correctness of what is generated, e.g. advice requests for terminal settings to change colors.

Effectiveness: Limited

This could raise the exploitation effort for an adversary, but the adversary might still be able to get string together multiple tokens in order to form the escape code.

Verification

How is it detected?

Automated Static Analysis

High
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)