COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATIONDraft

CWE-311

Missing Encryption of Sensitive Data

The product does not encrypt sensitive or critical information before storage or transmission.

Abstraction

Class

Structure

Simple

Likelihood of Exploit

High

Understand the problem

What is the problem?

The product does not encrypt sensitive or critical information before storage or transmission.

Root cause

How and when does the problem arise?

Lifecycle phase

Architecture and Design

OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.

Lifecycle phase

Operation

Risk

What does successful exploitation lead to?

Read Application Data

Affected security scopes: Confidentiality

If the application does not use a secure channel, such as SSL, to exchange sensitive information, it is possible for an attacker with access to the network traffic to sniff packets from the connection and uncover the data. This attack is not technically difficult, but does require physical access to some portion of the network over which the sensitive data travels. This access is usually somewhere near where the user is connected to the network (such as a colleague on the company network) but can be anywhere along the path from the user to the end server.
Modify Application Data

Affected security scopes: Confidentiality, Integrity

Omitting the use of encryption in any program which transfers data over a network of any kind should be considered on par with delivering the data sent to each user on the local networks of both the sender and receiver. Worse, this omission allows for the injection of data into a stream of communication between two parties -- with no means for the victims to separate valid data from invalid. In this day of widespread network attacks and password collection sniffers, it is an unnecessary risk to omit encryption from the design of any system which might benefit from it.

Defence

How is it prevented and fixed?

Requirements

Security requirement

Detail
Clearly specify which data or resources are valuable enough that they should be protected by encryption. Require that any transmission or storage of this data/resource should use well-vetted encryption algorithms.

Architecture and Design

Architecture and design approach

Detail
Ensure that encryption is properly integrated into the system design, including but not necessarily limited to: - Encryption that is needed to store or transmit private data of the users of the system - Encryption that is needed to protect the system itself from unauthorized disclosure or tampering Identify the separate needs and contexts for encryption: - One-way (i.e., only the user or recipient needs to have the key). This can be achieved using public key cryptography, or other techniques in which the encrypting party (i.e., the product) does not need to have access to a private key. - Two-way (i.e., the encryption can be automatically performed on behalf of a user, but the key must be available so that the plaintext can be automatically recoverable by that user). This requires storage of the private key in a format that is recoverable only by the user (or perhaps by the operating system) in a way that cannot be recovered by others. Using threat modeling or other techniques, assume that data can be compromised through a separate vulnerability or weakness, and determine where encryption will be most effective. Ensure that data that should be private is not being inadvertently exposed using weaknesses such as insecure permissions (CWE-732). [REF-7]

Architecture and Design

Libraries or Frameworks

Detail
When there is a need to store or transmit sensitive data, use strong, up-to-date cryptographic algorithms to encrypt that data. Select a well-vetted algorithm that is currently considered to be strong by experts in the field, and use well-tested implementations. As with all cryptographic mechanisms, the source code should be available for analysis. For example, US government systems require FIPS 140-2 certification. Do not develop custom or private cryptographic algorithms. They will likely be exposed to attacks that are well-understood by cryptographers. Reverse engineering techniques are mature. If the algorithm can be compromised if attackers find out how it works, then it is especially weak. Periodically ensure that the cryptography has not become obsolete. Some older algorithms, once thought to require a billion years of computing time, can now be broken in days or hours. This includes MD4, MD5, SHA1, DES, and other algorithms that were once regarded as strong. [REF-267]

Architecture and Design

Separation of Privilege

Detail
Compartmentalize the system to have "safe" areas where trust boundaries can be unambiguously drawn. Do not allow sensitive data to go outside of the trust boundary and always be careful when interfacing with a compartment outside of the safe area. Ensure that appropriate compartmentalization is built into the system design, and the compartmentalization allows for and reinforces privilege separation functionality. Architects and designers should rely on the principle of least privilege to decide the appropriate time to use privileges and the time to drop privileges.

Implementation · Architecture and Design

Defence to apply across several lifecycle phases

Detail
When using industry-approved techniques, use them correctly. Don't cut corners by skipping resource-intensive steps (CWE-325). These steps are often essential for preventing common attacks.

Implementation

Attack Surface Reduction

Detail
Use naming conventions and strong types to make it easier to spot when sensitive data is being used. When creating structures, objects, or other complex entities, separate the sensitive and non-sensitive data as much as possible.

Effectiveness: Defense in Depth

This makes it easier to spot places in the code where data is being used that is unencrypted.

Verification

How is it detected?

Manual Analysis

High
The characterizaton of sensitive data often requires domain-specific understanding, so manual methods are useful. However, manual efforts might not achieve desired code coverage within limited time constraints. Black box methods may produce artifacts (e.g. stored data or unencrypted network transfer) that require manual evaluation.

Automated Analysis

Automated measurement of the entropy of an input/output source may indicate the use or lack of encryption, but human analysis is still required to distinguish intentionally-unencrypted data (e.g. metadata) from sensitive data.

Manual Static Analysis - Binary or Bytecode

SOAR Partial
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Binary / Bytecode disassembler - then use manual analysis for vulnerabilities & anomalies

Dynamic Analysis with Automated Results Interpretation

SOAR Partial
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Web Application Scanner Web Services Scanner Database Scanners

Dynamic Analysis with Manual Results Interpretation

High
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Highly cost effective: ``` Network Sniffer ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Fuzz Tester Framework-based Fuzzer Automated Monitored Execution Man-in-the-middle attack tool

Manual Static Analysis - Source Code

High
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Highly cost effective: ``` Focused Manual Spotcheck - Focused manual analysis of source Manual Source Code Review (not inspections)

Automated Static Analysis - Source Code

SOAR Partial
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Context-configured Source Code Weakness Analyzer

Architecture or Design Review

High
According to SOAR [REF-1479], the following detection techniques may be useful: ``` Highly cost effective: ``` Inspection (IEEE 1028 standard) (can apply to requirements, design, source code, etc.) Formal Methods / Correct-By-Construction ``` Cost effective for partial coverage: ``` Attack Modeling

MITRE diagram

Weakness relationships and flow

CWE-311 MITRE diagramı