COMMON WEAKNESS ENUMERATIONDraft

CWE-494

Download of Code Without Integrity Check

The product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.

Abstraction

Base

Structure

Simple

Likelihood of Exploit

Medium

Understand the problem

What is the problem?

The product downloads source code or an executable from a remote location and executes the code without sufficiently verifying the origin and integrity of the code.

Extended description

An attacker can execute malicious code by compromising the host server, performing DNS spoofing, or modifying the code in transit.

Root cause

How and when does the problem arise?

Lifecycle phase

Architecture and Design

OMISSION: This weakness is caused by missing a security tactic during the architecture and design phase.

Lifecycle phase

Implementation

Risk

What does successful exploitation lead to?

Execute Unauthorized Code or CommandsAlter Execution LogicOther

Affected security scopes: Integrity, Availability, Confidentiality, Other

Executing untrusted code could compromise the control flow of the program. The untrusted code could execute attacker-controlled commands, read or modify sensitive resources, or prevent the software from functioning correctly for legitimate users.

Defence

How is it prevented and fixed?

Implementation

Implementation-phase defence

Detail
Perform proper forward and reverse DNS lookups to detect DNS spoofing.

This is only a partial solution since it will not prevent your code from being modified on the hosting site or in transit.

Architecture and Design · Operation

Defence to apply across several lifecycle phases

Detail
Encrypt the code with a reliable encryption scheme before transmitting. This will only be a partial solution, since it will not detect DNS spoofing and it will not prevent your code from being modified on the hosting site.

Architecture and Design

Libraries or Frameworks

Detail
Use a vetted library or framework that does not allow this weakness to occur or provides constructs that make this weakness easier to avoid [REF-1482]. Speficially, it may be helpful to use tools or frameworks to perform integrity checking on the transmitted code. - When providing the code that is to be downloaded, such as for automatic updates of the software, then use cryptographic signatures for the code and modify the download clients to verify the signatures. Ensure that the implementation does not contain CWE-295, CWE-320, CWE-347, and related weaknesses. - Use code signing technologies such as Authenticode. See references [REF-454] [REF-455] [REF-456].

Architecture and Design · Operation

Environment Hardening

Detail
Run your code using the lowest privileges that are required to accomplish the necessary tasks [REF-76]. If possible, create isolated accounts with limited privileges that are only used for a single task. That way, a successful attack will not immediately give the attacker access to the rest of the software or its environment. For example, database applications rarely need to run as the database administrator, especially in day-to-day operations.

Architecture and Design · Operation

Sandbox or Jail

Detail
Run the code in a "jail" or similar sandbox environment that enforces strict boundaries between the process and the operating system. This may effectively restrict which files can be accessed in a particular directory or which commands can be executed by the software. OS-level examples include the Unix chroot jail, AppArmor, and SELinux. In general, managed code may provide some protection. For example, java.io.FilePermission in the Java SecurityManager allows the software to specify restrictions on file operations. This may not be a feasible solution, and it only limits the impact to the operating system; the rest of the application may still be subject to compromise. Be careful to avoid CWE-243 and other weaknesses related to jails.

Effectiveness: Limited

The effectiveness of this mitigation depends on the prevention capabilities of the specific sandbox or jail being used and might only help to reduce the scope of an attack, such as restricting the attacker to certain system calls or limiting the portion of the file system that can be accessed.

Verification

How is it detected?

Manual Analysis

This weakness can be detected using tools and techniques that require manual (human) analysis, such as penetration testing, threat modeling, and interactive tools that allow the tester to record and modify an active session. Specifically, manual static analysis is typically required to find the behavior that triggers the download of code, and to determine whether integrity-checking methods are in use.

These may be more effective than strictly automated techniques. This is especially the case with weaknesses that are related to design and business rules.

Black Box

Use monitoring tools that examine the software's process as it interacts with the operating system and the network. This technique is useful in cases when source code is unavailable, if the software was not developed by you, or if you want to verify that the build phase did not introduce any new weaknesses. Examples include debuggers that directly attach to the running process; system-call tracing utilities such as truss (Solaris) and strace (Linux); system activity monitors such as FileMon, RegMon, Process Monitor, and other Sysinternals utilities (Windows); and sniffers and protocol analyzers that monitor network traffic. Attach the monitor to the process and also sniff the network connection. Trigger features related to product updates or plugin installation, which is likely to force a code download. Monitor when files are downloaded and separately executed, or if they are otherwise read back into the process. Look for evidence of cryptographic library calls that use integrity checking.

Automated Static Analysis

High
Automated static analysis, commonly referred to as Static Application Security Testing (SAST), can find some instances of this weakness by analyzing source code (or binary/compiled code) without having to execute it. Typically, this is done by building a model of data flow and control flow, then searching for potentially-vulnerable patterns that connect "sources" (origins of input) with "sinks" (destinations where the data interacts with external components, a lower layer such as the OS, etc.)