CAPEC-463
Padding Oracle Crypto Attack
An adversary is able to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key if a target system leaks data on whether or not a padding error happened while decrypting the ciphertext. A target system that leaks this type of information becomes the padding oracle and an adversary is able to make use of that oracle to efficiently decrypt data without knowing the decryption key by issuing on average 128*b calls to the padding oracle (where b is the number of bytes in the ciphertext block). In addition to performing decryption, an adversary is also able to produce valid ciphertexts (i.e., perform encryption) by using the padding oracle, all without knowing the encryption key.
Abstraction
Detailed
Typical severity
High
Likelihood of attack
Medium
Understand the attack
What is this attack pattern?
Extended description
Requirements
What does the attack require?
Prerequisites
- The decryption routine does not properly authenticate the message / does not verify its integrity prior to performing the decryption operation
- The target system leaks data (in some way) on whether a padding error has occurred when attempting to decrypt the ciphertext.
- The padding oracle remains available for enough time / for as many requests as needed for the adversary to decrypt the ciphertext.
Skills required
Not stated in the MITRE record.
Resources required
- Ability to detect instances where a target system is vulnerable to an oracle padding attack Sufficient cryptography knowledge and tools needed to take advantage of the presence of the padding oracle to perform decryption / encryption of data without a key
Defence
How is it prevented and mitigated?
Real world