COMMON ATTACK PATTERN ENUMERATION AND CLASSIFICATIONLive MITRE record

CAPEC-598

DNS Spoofing

An adversary sends a malicious ("NXDOMAIN" ("No such domain") code, or DNS A record) response to a target's route request before a legitimate resolver can. This technique requires an On-path or In-path device that can monitor and respond to the target's DNS requests. This attack differs from BGP Tampering in that it directly responds to requests made by the target instead of polluting the routing the target's infrastructure uses.

Abstraction

Detailed

Typical severity

High

Likelihood of attack

Medium

Understand the attack

What is this attack pattern?

An adversary sends a malicious ("NXDOMAIN" ("No such domain") code, or DNS A record) response to a target's route request before a legitimate resolver can. This technique requires an On-path or In-path device that can monitor and respond to the target's DNS requests. This attack differs from BGP Tampering in that it directly responds to requests made by the target instead of polluting the routing the target's infrastructure uses.

Requirements

What does the attack require?

Prerequisites

  • On/In Path Device

Skills required

  • Low: To distribute email

Resources required

Not stated in the MITRE record.

Defence

How is it prevented and mitigated?

1
Design: Avoid dependence on DNS
2
Design: Include "hosts file"/IP address in the application
3
Implementation: Utilize a .onion domain with Tor support
4
Implementation: DNSSEC
5
Implementation: DNS-hold-open

Real world

MITRE example instances

Example instance 1Detail
Below-Recursive DNS Poisoning: When an On/In-path device between a recursive DNS server and a user sends a malicious ("NXDOMAIN" ("No such domain") code, or DNS A record ) response before a legitimate resolver can.
Example instance 2Detail
Above-Recursive DNS Poisoning: When an On/In-path device between an authority server (e.g., government-managed) and a recursive DNS server sends a malicious ("NXDOMAIN" ("No such domain")code, or a DNS record) response before a legitimate resolver can.